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The Myth of the Sacred: The Charter, the Courts, and the
Politics of the Constitution in Canada
Eds. Patrick James, Donald E. Abelson, Michael Lusztig
Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002 (208 pp.)

Reviewed by Katherine Burket

By the religious metaphor in this work's title, the editors immediately
reveal the approach they have taken to their subject. The main goal of
this collection of essays is to break down the "myths" surrounding
Canada's constitutional holiest of holies, the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. The myth the editors are most concerned with, and about, is
the widespread, and the authors believe unquestioningly pious, faith in
the Charter's ability to bring Canada towards a just and equal society.
The editors and authors have set out to unpack the consequences of this
conviction on Canada's political landscape; their conclusion is that
judicial activism, interest group politics and the increasing centralization of power have flipped our political system from one of parliamentary supremacy to judicial supremacy. As an example, the book warms
up to its theme in the introduction by taking thin pot-shots at what the
editors believe to be the political infeasibility of using s.33, the "notwithstanding" clause, which they see as evidence of elected
Parliament's increasing deference to the non-elected judiciary. 1
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The tack of the editors in their introduction, and in the papers they
selected for this collection, is quite useful: the papers approach the
"sacred" beliefs, such as the ability of the Charter to have a positive
impact on equality and justice in Canadian society, with a scepticism
based on pure theory and mathematical assessment. In discussing the
impracticalities of accurately measuring the impact of Charter decisions
the editors' ideological agenda becomes clear and all the easier to
engage with head on. The central refrain in the set-up to the essays in
this collection is that by helping groups who form the most impoverished or marginalized segments of our population, we inevitably replace
them with another group to take up the lowest rung on the ladder. The
impossibility of achieving true consensus about who is "most
marginalized" is also discussed, with reference to Frank Michelman's
thoughts on the failures of legitimacy in any institutionalized decisionmaking structure such as Parliament.
This is a valid point - it is hard to argue that 33 million people could
agree on who needs help the most, the soonest, the longest, let alone
agreeing on the definitions of "help" or who constitutes a member of
that group (R. v. Corbiere is a perfect example). Indeed, there are some
assumptions that cannot move from the controlled theoretical laboratory
to complex real-life situations without breaking down. What many
essays in this collection do, however, is base their critical framework
upon these assumptions without fully exploring them. For example, the
editors cite the on-going contentious political debate and real violence
associated with the allocation of the contentious debate over fishing
rights in Atlantic Canada between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal fishers as an example of liberal idealists' attempts to improve the lot of the
"worst off." The problem, they argue, was trying to solve the problem
by granting further access rights to Aboriginals at the 'expense' of nonAboriginal groups traditionally dependant for their livelihood on those
fishing rights:
Non-Aboriginal fishermen do not welcome seeing their fishing rights
restricted in order that income be redistributed toward Aboriginals.
Those who favour Aboriginal claims, in this instance and in others,
automatically assume that they are helping those 'worst off. But
surely the practical difficulties of measurement of both average levels
and within-group distribution come to the forefront in a case.c
2

Ibid., at 7.
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This description ignores many of the complexities involved. Two
Marshall fishing decisions, violence at Burnt Church and other coastal
communities, on-going litigation and community upheaval were not
simply a result of people trying to "[help] those 'worst off'." Rather,
they are the culmination of centuries of racist politics and policies,
broken treaties and attempts at compensation, and inarguable realities of
environmental, industrial and social change. People trying to ensure
reasonable and fair recognition of Aboriginal rights are not simply
trying to help Aboriginals out of a sense of liberal guilt; they are, in
many cases, trying to ensure the Crown abides by its legal obligations.
The assumption that the re-allocation of fishing rights in the Atlantic
provinces was "automatic" demonstrates how simplification in the interests of theoretical clarity renders the resulting analysis devoid of any
practically useless.
Further, I do not think that the problems of measurement - that is,
the difficulty in establishing just which groups, are, specifically, on
average, "worst off' - is a legitimate impediment to taking definitive
action geared towards raising the general level of equality in Canadian
society. After all, it was a fairly elected Parliament that determined the
basic rights guaranteed in the Charter, so it is a troubling
mischaracterization to say that the Court's interpretation of the scope of
these rights is misplaced because we cannot know if and how groups are
benefiting. The scope of the Charter is rightly a matter of interpretation
for both academics and the judiciary, and problems of implementation
are properly considered by both the judiciary and Parliamentarians. Yet
in the analysis suggested by the editors here, these sets of complicated
and complementary relationships are glossed over via a concern about
measurements. The editors are more than welcome to their opinion that
the judiciary has been overzealous in expanding rights, but that opinion
should not be couched in the guise of the difficulty of building a big
enough ruler.
These critiques - the oversimplification of factors contributing to
socio-political legal flash-points, and the difficulty of transferring
thought-problem based theories to reality - have been already levelled
at other academics, perhaps most notably John Rawls and his theoretical
'original position.' Fitting that this collection takes as a tenet of the
Charter religion the need to implement a Rawlsian economic plan (one
that devotes tax dollars to such things as a social welfare net), based on
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the presumed results of a theoretically administered (and recognizably
flawed) thought-experiment. The essays as a group then go on to demonstrate how the Charter, the partisan politics that went into its creation,
and the social welfare policies that flow out of it, have done on the
whole more hann than good.
Each chapter explores the sacrosanct dogmas of Canadian constitutional politics in more depth - primarily the presumption that political
decisions demanded by interest group based politics and granted by a
judiciary bent on rights and resource redistribution does, in fact, benefit
Canadians. The authors in this collection are generally critical of these
trends in the Canadian system, and argue essentially that "under the
guise of universal fairness, justice-seekers actually promote an agenda
of redistribution over efficiency." 3 This, then, is the calamitous result of
an unexamined faith: the precarious balance between efficient and
redistributive institutions and policies is disrupted by increasing interference on behalf of the judiciary via Charter jurisprudence.
The book uses Tsebelis' definitions of efficient ("those that 'improve (with respect to the status quo) the condition of all (or almost all)
individuals or groups in a society") and redistributive ("'those that
improve the conditions of one group in society at the expense of another"')4 to illuminate this basic dichotomy. The question explicitly
raised is: what is the balance that achieves justice? Again, the answer
here is manifest from the beginning: the less judicial intervention forcing the legislature's hand, the better.
The following chapters fall into four categories, the first of which
deals with the issue of judicial review and the recognition of various
minority and interest groups in Canada. In "Judicial Rationalism and the
Therapeutic Constitution: The Supreme Court's Reconstruction of
Equality and Democratic Process under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms", Anthony Peacock concludes that the Supreme Court is using
Charter litigation as an opportunity not to protect minority groups, but to
carve out a political role for itself, such that the Court dictates the
development of social policy. He states that

3
4

Ibid., at 14.
Ibid., at 4.
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[w]ith the aim of achieving substantive equality and removing social
deviancy from the political landscape, democracy under the Charter
has become therapy and the Court a rehabilitative clinic. 5

The following paper, by Mark Rush ("Judicial Supervision of the Political Process"), develops this thesis in a comparative analysis of the
treatment of gay rights by the Canadian and American Supreme Courts.
Both this and the final chapter in this section ("the Supreme Court of
Canada and the Complexity of Judicial Activism" by Jack Kelly) debate
the usefulness of judicial intervention in a liberal constitutional democracy, and both essentially conclude that judicial activism tends to
weaken the democratic nature of the state.
The second and third sections of the collection focus on rational
choice theory and interest-group politics, respectively. Tom Flanagan's
essay on Canada's three constitutions is interesting and sets out clearly
how rational choice theory is used by academics to explore the relationship between Parliament and the courts. That the basis of his model of
chaos and game theory developed initially to explain the dynamics of
separation of powers and legislative committee relationships in the
United States was important to footnote, as it reveals some of the
unarticulated assumptions that underlie the scheme.
The final section of essays deals explicitly with the culture of
constitutionalism in Canada, both in the sense that our constitution is
intended to be an expression of shared values, but also in exploring the
pervasive awareness of the role of the Constitution and the Charter in the
Canada's political psyche, as put forth in Michael Lusztig's "Deeper and
Deeper: Deep Diversity, Federalism, and Redistributive Politics in
Canada". The final essay, Hudson Meadwell's "Is it 'True'?" tries to
take apaii Will Kymlicka's suggestion that the solution to our intem1inable, insecure constitutional debate is to create a "multination federation." Meadwell believes that Kymlicka's analogies to other poly-cultural/linguistic federations (Spain, Germany, and particularly Switzerland) are false in that not even Switzerland is multinational. In short,
Meadwell doubts that Kymlicka's suggestion is at all tenable for either
domestic stability or international relations. He refuses to accept that
such a move is even desirable, as it amounts to essentially entrenching
identity politics as the main ground of constitutional recognition of
5

Ibid., at 35.
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citizens, and would therefore do nothing more than exacerbate tensions
between different regions and groups in Canada (such as between
Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Atlantic fishermen mentioned above).
The main thrust of these essays is to question what the authors
perceive to be an otherwise unassailed belief in the Canadian approach
to social welfare policies, particularly when they are implemented, as
the authors' believe, via constitutional jurisprudence rather than legislative pronouncement. The essays, particularly when they are focussed on
constructing a theoretical analysis, are valuable in demonstrating how
important it is to push past theory and into real world complexities.
Considering the potentially disastrous effect of making decisions based
solely on either "effective institutions" or the "desire to help those who
are 'worst off','' the debates brought about by the investigations such as
these are extremely imp01iant in the pursuit of a general consensus on
intervention and justice.

